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Bruce  Gardner
The  main  substantive  results  of the  analysis  know to have been  implemented, the approach
by Womack are the simulated effects of the four  by James  P.  Houck  and  his  colleagues  at  the
buffer-stock  alternatives;  and  the  (Payment  in  University  of Minnesota,  would  be  quite  inad-
Kind)  program  of  1983  as  compared  to  alter-  equate  here.  Also,  export  demand  elasticities
natives. These  results are generally that reserve  are  quite low.  Explanation  is  needed.
programs with a reserve placement trigger well  Most important is non-program  stock demand.
above  the  CCC  loan  rate,  and  coupled  with above  the  CCC  loan  rate,  and  coupled  with  This  seems  to  be  treated  simply  as  a  demand
acreage  controls  to support  that price,  give the  component,  represented  by an elasticity of de-
highest  market  price  but  lower  stocks.  The  mand for stocks  as  a function  of current price.
"minimum"  (pre-1977  Act)  alternative  gives h"minimum"  (pre-1977  Act)  alhtecrnativee  gives  But the  level  of  stock  demand will in  general
higher prices  than  the  loan  rate;  acreage  con-  be  sensitive  to  the  public  stock  regime.  That
trols  tend  to  keep  price  above  the  loan  rate.  is, where we  have government  aquisition at the
These qualitative  results are sensible, but a sim-  w  w  h  g  These  qualitative  results  are sensible, but a sim-  loan rate and release  at 1.15 times the loan rate
ulation  model  is  not necessary  to derive them.  (the "minimu"  oti,  expect to see very The 1983.84  PIK programanalysisgivessom  (the "minimum"  option), we expect to see very The  1983-84  PIK program  analysis  gives  some  little  stockholding  as  long  as  the  government
interesting estimates  of how much lower prices  ls  sig  stocks  (as we  actually saw  in
during  that  period  would  have  been  if  less  this  regime).  But  when  the  government  sells
acreage  had  been  removed  from  production.  out,  rite  trers migt  o  e  hold sub- The aout, private traders  might continue to hold sub- The answer is a surprisingly small price effect-  stantial  quantities  (at prices  above  the  release 14 million  more  acres,  yields  20-25  percent  stantial  quantities  (at  prices  above  the  release
14  million  more  acres,  yields  20-25  percent  price). The reason is that there is still substantial
more  output, but only a  5 percent  lower price,  upside  price  potential,  as  we  know  from  the upside  price  potential,  as  we  know  from  the
The paper was not clear on how and why the  1970's when prices  rose to twice the loan rate.
particular  1970-76  and  1973-79  simulations  On the other  hand,  with farmer-owned  reserve
were  done.  That  is,  are actual  data used  in the  release  at  1.45  and  1.75  times  the  loan  rate
1977 Act  simulations for  1978-81? Also,  target  there  is  less  room  for  speculative  storage  at
price  and  loan  rates  are  kept  the  same  in  all  times  when  price  is,  say,  1.3  times  the  loan
simulations,  so  we  cannot  see  what  difference  rate. But with price at 1.15  times the loan rate,
they  make.  We  are  thus  looking  at  a  narrow  farmers  could  bet that  a  release  price  at  1.75
range of policies.  times the loan rate for wheat would make price
rise up to that intermediate  level faster, or with
Generally  troublesome  is  the  lack  of  detail  higher probability,  under the farmer-owned  re-
in  the  paper  about  (a)  what  the  results  look  serve  program.
like  and  (b)  what  generates  the  results.  For
given  target  and  loan  prices,  varying  farmer-  In short,  one cannot  just use  an elasticity  of
owned  reserve  provisions  should  affect  mostly  stock  demand,  but  must  respecify  the  profit-
stabilization,  so  one would  like to  see year-by-  seeking storage function separately for each gov-
year effects, with some sort of stochastic results.  ernmental storage program. This is a major prob-
That is, how was the probability distribution of  with  the  approach  as  presented  in  this
prices  affected?  And  what  happens  to  exports,  paper;  and  I  cannot  take  the  results  seriously
yields, and the livestock sector? The within-year  without  knowing  more  about  the  procedures
discussion  was  quite  opaque  to  me.  followed  in modeling  non-program  holding  of
stocks.
On  the  issue  of what  generates  the  results,
we see  a table  of demand  and  acreage  elastic-  Even if the results hold up, another problem
ities, but no specification  of equations.  That is,  of the paper is that some of the general lessons
how  was  acreage  control  put  in  the  supply  drawn  at the end  are not well tied  to  the sim-
equations?  The  best  available  specifications  I  ulation  results.
Bruce  Gardner  is  a  Professor  of Agricultural  and  Resource  Economics,  University  of Maryland.
Invited discussion presented at the annual meeting of the Southern Agricultural Economics Association, Nashville, Tennessee,
February  5-8,  1984.  Invited papers are  routinely published  in the July SJAE without editorial council review but with review
of the  copy editor  (as per Executive  Committee  action June  25,  1982).
39The  paper  makes  a few historical  points  that  convincing  story  to tell.  Not  that  it  is  wrong,
are  dubious  or  at  least  not  supported  by  the  but one  does  not get  a feel  for where  some  of
work presented.  One  is  that the cornerstone  of  the key conclusions are  coming from,  which  is
the  1981  Act is a buffer stock program. Another  required  for confidence  in  them.  Generally,  it
is  the reasons  given for implementation  of the  seems  that a simulation  model  like this  one  is
farmer-owned  reserve.  A case can be made  that  not used  to  its  best  advantage  in  this  kind  of
the program's political survivability,  and its eco-  work,  i.e.,  estimating  the effects  of actual  past
nomic  downfall,  derived  from  the  use  of  an  programs.  The  model  would  be  more  helpful
increased  farmer-owned  reserves  entry price  as  in  obtaining  an  advance  indication  of  conse-
a method of raising the de facto market support  quences  of a  fairly  narrow  range  of  proposed
price  without raising  the loan rate.  policy options,  such as alternative  target price
In summary, this paper does not have a really  levels  in  the  1985  farm bill.
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